VOTING IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS FOR LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS IN A FISCALLY CENTRALIZED ECONOMY
In this paper we develop a probabilistic voting model of inter-governmental transfers to explain the distribution and size of local public goods. We find that, i) The parties political competition for votes induces the central government to provide regional transfers that lead to Pareto efficient lo...
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| Pubblicato in: | Estudios Económicos |
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| Autori principali: | , |
| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
El Colegio de México, A.C.
2011
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=59719742005 |
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