‘THE POSITIVIST MAY BE RIGHT’. LEGAL CONVENTIONALISM REVISITED
This paper revisits Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between concurrent and conventional morality. The first part of the paper argues that this distinction is best understood as being about normative, not motivating, reasons. Thus understood, the challenge that the distinction poses to Hart’s social rul...
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| Publicado no: | Problema: Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
2016
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421943648003 |
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