Electoral competition, tax design and the tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency
This paper analyzes a political economy model of taxation in which political parties design the provision of a public good and the structure of a commodity tax system to maximize votes in the election. In this economy the individuals’ vote choice is determined by parties’ policies and voters’ parti...
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| Publicado no: | Análisis Económico |
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| Principais autores: | , |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana
2012
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41324545007 |
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