Two Quantum-Mechanical Arguments against the Metaphysical Equivalence between Substratum and Bundle Theories of Individuality
It is a widespread consensus among metaphysicians that the bundle and substratum theories are substantially different metaphysical theories of individuality. In a realist stance towards metaphysics, they cannot both track the truth when describing fundamental reality, thus they’re rival metaphysical...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Análisis Filosófico |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprache: | Inglês |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
2025
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| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340084375021 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340084375021/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340084375021/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340084375021/340084375021.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340084375021/movil |
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