Why the Content of Animal Thought cannot be Propositional
In “Steps toward Origins of Propositional Thought”, Burge claims that animals of different species are capable of making deductive inferences. According to Burge, that is why propositional thought is extended beyond the human mind to the minds of other kinds of creatures. But, as I argue here, the i...
Zapisane w:
| Wydane w: | Análisis Filosófico |
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| 1. autor: | |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Język: | Inglês |
| Wydane: |
Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Filosófico
2018
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| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=340060433003 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060433003/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060433003/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060433003/340060433003.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/3400/340060433003/movil |
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