Semantic Epistemology: Response to Machery
Machery argues: (1) that “philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s —if anything, they are probably worse”; (2) that “intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference”. (1) lacks the...
Gorde:
| Argitaratua izan da: | THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia |
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| Egile nagusia: | |
| Formatua: | Artigo |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglês |
| Argitaratua: |
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2012
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| Gaiak: | |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730819008 |
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