Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt
In this article, I argue that philosophers’ intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people’s and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good ev- idence for theories of reference.
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| Pubblicato in: | THEORIA. Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia |
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| Autore principale: | |
| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
Universidad del País Vasco/Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea
2012
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| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339730819007 |
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