Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia
I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a "public goods trap" rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested inte...
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| Vydáno v: | Cuadernos de Economía |
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| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
Universidad Nacional de Colombia
2019
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| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=282162443001 https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282162443001/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282162443001/html/ https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282162443001/282162443001.epub https://www.redalyc.org/journal/2821/282162443001/movil |
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