Spatial competition and the duration of managerial incentive contracts
We consider a duopoly model of spatial competition in which the owners ofthe firms can strategically use two variables: the duration of managerial incentivecontracts and the location of the firms. In equilibrium, one ownerchooses a long-term incentive contract for his manager (becoming a leaderin in...
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| Опубликовано в:: | Investigaciones Económicas |
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| Главные авторы: | , |
| Формат: | Artigo |
| Язык: | Inglês |
| Опубликовано: |
Fundación SEPI
2005
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=17329204 |
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