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Exit rights open complex pathways to cooperation
We study the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which cooperators and defectors interact with another actor type called exiters. Rather than being exploited by defectors, exiters exit the game in favour of a small pay-off. We find that this simple extension of the game allows co...
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| Publicado no: | J R Soc Interface |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
The Royal Society
2021
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7879764/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/33435841 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsif.2020.0777 |
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