Ładuje się......
Punishment and inspection for governing the commons in a feedback-evolving game
Utilizing common resources is always a dilemma for community members. While cooperator players restrain themselves and consider the proper state of resources, defectors demand more than their supposed share for a higher payoff. To avoid the tragedy of the common state, punishing the latter group see...
Zapisane w:
| Wydane w: | PLoS Comput Biol |
|---|---|
| Główni autorzy: | , |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Język: | Inglês |
| Wydane: |
Public Library of Science
2018
|
| Hasła przedmiotowe: | |
| Dostęp online: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6070290/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/30028836 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006347 |
| Etykiety: |
Dodaj etykietę
Nie ma etykietki, Dołącz pierwszą etykiete!
|