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Stochastic evolutionary voluntary public goods game with punishment in a Quasi-birth-and-death process
Traditional replication dynamic model and the corresponding concept of evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) only takes into account whether the system can return to the equilibrium after being subjected to a small disturbance. In the real world, due to continuous noise, the ESS of the system may not b...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | Sci Rep |
|---|---|
| मुख्य लेखकों: | , , , |
| स्वरूप: | Artigo |
| भाषा: | Inglês |
| प्रकाशित: |
Nature Publishing Group UK
2017
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5700967/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29170523 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-16140-8 |
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