Načítá se...
Kriegel on the Phenomenology of Action
I focus on Uriah Kriegel’s account of conative phenomenology. I agree with Kriegel’s argument that some conative phenomenology is primitive in that some conative phenomenal properties cannot be reduced to another kind of property (e.g., perceptual or cognitive). I disagree, however, with Kriegel’s s...
Uloženo v:
| Vydáno v: | Riv Internazionale Filos Psicol |
|---|---|
| Hlavní autor: | |
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
2016
|
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5612388/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28955439 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.4453/rifp.2016.0026 |
| Tagy: |
Přidat tag
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo otaguje tento záznam!
|