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Bribery games on inter-dependent regular networks
We examine a scenario of social conflict that is manifest during an interaction between government servants providing a service and citizens who are legally entitled to the service, using evolutionary game-theory in structured populations characterized by an inter-dependent network. Bribe-demands by...
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| Publicat a: | Sci Rep |
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| Autors principals: | , , |
| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicat: |
Nature Publishing Group
2017
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5311942/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/28205644 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep42735 |
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