載入...

Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations with zealots

We investigate evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy matrix games with zealots in finite populations. Zealots are assumed to take either strategy regardless of the fitness. When the strategy selected by the zealots is the same, the fixation of the strategy selected by the zealots is a trivial outcom...

全面介紹

Na minha lista:
書目詳細資料
發表在:J Math Biol
Main Authors: Nakajima, Yohei, Masuda, Naoki
格式: Artigo
語言:Inglês
出版: Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2014
主題:
在線閱讀:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4289535/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24610380
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00285-014-0770-2
標簽: 添加標簽
沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!