A carregar...

Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments

In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The que...

ver descrição completa

Na minha lista:
Detalhes bibliográficos
Main Authors: Chen, Xiaojie, Perc, Matjaž
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Publicado em: Frontiers Media S.A. 2014
Assuntos:
Acesso em linha:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4107675/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25100959
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248
Tags: Adicionar Tag
Sem tags, seja o primeiro a adicionar uma tag!