Učitavanje...
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortio...
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| Glavni autori: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Jezik: | Inglês |
| Izdano: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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| Teme: | |
| Online pristup: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4074784/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24975112 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05496 |
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