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Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations

We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortio...

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Bibliografski detalji
Glavni autori: Szolnoki, Attila, Perc, Matjaž
Format: Artigo
Jezik:Inglês
Izdano: Nature Publishing Group 2014
Teme:
Online pristup:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4074784/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24975112
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05496
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