Nalaganje...
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortio...
Shranjeno v:
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Artigo |
| Jezik: | Inglês |
| Izdano: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
|
| Teme: | |
| Online dostop: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4074784/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24975112 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep05496 |
| Oznake: |
Označite
Brez oznak, prvi označite!
|