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Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribu...
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| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglês |
| Publicado: |
Nature Publishing Group
2014
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3932447/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24561876 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep04161 |
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