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The Evolution of Strategic Timing in Collective-Risk Dilemmas
In collective-risk dilemmas, a group needs to collaborate over time to avoid a catastrophic event. This gives rise to a coordination game with many equilibria, including equilibria where no one contributes, and thus no measures against the catastrophe are taken. In this game, the timing of contribut...
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| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Public Library of Science
2013
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| Assuntos: | |
| Acesso em linha: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3682992/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23799109 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0066490 |
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