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Between cheap and costly signals: the evolution of partially honest communication
Costly signalling theory has become a common explanation for honest communication when interests conflict. In this paper, we provide an alternative explanation for partially honest communication that does not require significant signal costs. We show that this alternative is at least as plausible as...
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| Auteurs principaux: | , , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Langue: | Inglês |
| Publié: |
The Royal Society
2013
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| Sujets: | |
| Accès en ligne: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3574420/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23135681 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2012.1878 |
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