Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of ran...
में बचाया:
| में प्रकाशित: | Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A |
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| मुख्य लेखकों: | , |
| स्वरूप: | Artigo |
| भाषा: | Inglês |
| प्रकाशित: |
National Academy of Sciences
1982
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC345957/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16593160/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.79.4.1331 |
| टैग: |
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