Assortment of encounters and evolution of cooperativeness
The method of evolutionary stable strategies (ESS), in its current form, is confronted with a difficulty when it tries to explain how some social behaviors initiate their evolution. We show that this difficulty may be removed by changing the assumption made tacitly in game theory (and in ESS) of ran...
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| Опубликовано в:: | Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A |
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| Главные авторы: | , |
| Формат: | Artigo |
| Язык: | Inglês |
| Опубликовано: |
National Academy of Sciences
1982
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| Предметы: | |
| Online-ссылка: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC345957/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16593160/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.79.4.1331 |
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