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Three is a crowd in iterated prisoner's dilemmas: experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior

Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here repor...

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Autors principals: Grujić, Jelena, Eke, Burcu, Cabrales, Antonio, Cuesta, José A., Sánchez, Angel
Format: Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Publicat: Nature Publishing Group 2012
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Accés en línia:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3435562/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22962633
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1038/srep00638
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