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Inferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
In realistic world individuals with high reputation are more likely to influence the collective behaviors. Due to the cost and error of information dissemination, however, it is unreasonable to assign each individual with a complete cognitive power, which means that not everyone can accurately reali...
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| Autors principals: | , , , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicat: |
Public Library of Science
2012
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| Matèries: | |
| Accés en línia: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3392274/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22808120 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0040218 |
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