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Evolutionary Game Dynamics in Finite Populations with Strong Selection and Weak Mutation
We study stochastic game dynamics in finite populations. To this end we extend the classical Moran process to incorporate frequency-dependent selection and mutation. For 2 × 2 games, we give a complete analysis of the long-run behavior when mutation rates are small. For 3 × 3 coordination games, we...
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , , , |
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| Μορφή: | Artigo |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglês |
| Έκδοση: |
2006
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| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3279757/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16987535 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2006.07.006 |
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