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Inference in a Synchronization Game with Social Interactions
This paper studies inference in a continuous time game where an agent's decision to quit an activity depends on the participation of other players. In equilibrium, similar actions can be explained not only by direct influences but also by correlated factors. Our model can be seen as a simultane...
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| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Language: | Inglês |
| Published: |
2009
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2799333/ https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20046804 https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2008.09.027 |
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