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Constraining free riding in public goods games: designated solitary punishers can sustain human cooperation

Much of human cooperation remains an evolutionary riddle. Unlike other animals, people frequently cooperate with non-relatives in large groups. Evolutionary models of large-scale cooperation require not just incentives for cooperation, but also a credible disincentive for free riding. Various theore...

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Bibliografski detalji
Glavni autori: O'Gorman, Rick, Henrich, Joseph, Van Vugt, Mark
Format: Artigo
Jezik:Inglês
Izdano: The Royal Society 2008
Teme:
Online pristup:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2674351/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18812292
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2008.1082
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