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Population dynamics, demographic stochasticity, and the evolution of cooperation

A basic evolutionary problem posed by the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game is to understand when the paradigmatic cooperative strategy Tit-for-Tat can invade a population of pure defectors. Deterministically, this is impossible. We consider the role of demographic stochasticity by embedding the Iter...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Main Authors: Doebeli, Michael, Blarer, Albert, Ackermann, Martin
Formato: Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
Publicado em: The National Academy of Sciences of the USA 1997
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Acesso em linha:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC24650/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/9144209
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