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The limits to cost-free signalling of need between relatives.

Theoretical models have demonstrated the possibility of stable cost-free signalling of need between relatives. The stability of these cost-free equilibria depends on the indirect fitness cost of cheating and deceiving a donor into giving away resources. We show that this stability is highly sensitiv...

詳細記述

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書誌詳細
主要な著者: Brilot, Ben O, Johnstone, Rufus A
フォーマット: Artigo
言語:Inglês
出版事項: 2003
主題:
オンライン・アクセス:https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1691334/
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12803895
https://ncbi.nlm.nih.govhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2003.2329
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