Cargando...

An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions

We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to inves...

Descripción completa

Guardado en:
Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Karl Jandoc, Ruben Juarez
Formato: Artigo
Lenguaje:Inglês
Publicado: MDPI AG 2019-08-01
Colección:Games
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/3/31
Etiquetas: Agregar Etiqueta
Sin Etiquetas, Sea el primero en etiquetar este registro!