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An Experimental Study of Self-Enforcing Coalitions
We study a model in which agents endowed with power compete for a divisible resource by forming coalitions with other agents. The coalition with the greatest power wins the resource and divides it among its members via proportional sharing. We conduct an economic experiment using this model to inves...
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Autores principales: | , |
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Formato: | Artigo |
Lenguaje: | Inglês |
Publicado: |
MDPI AG
2019-08-01
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Colección: | Games |
Materias: | |
Acceso en línea: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/10/3/31 |
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