Can “Complex” Market Designs Make it from Theory to Practice? Changing the Course Allocation Mechanism at Wharton

Budish (2011) proposes a new mechanism for the problem of combinatorial assignment -- e.g., assigning students to schedules of courses -- called approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI). While the CEEI mechanism satisfies attractive properties of efficiency, fairness, and incent...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Eric Budish
Formato: Artigo
Lenguaje:Inglês
Publicado: European Alliance for Innovation (EAI) 2016-12-01
Colección:EAI Endorsed Transactions on Serious Games
Materias:
market design
matching
combinatorial allocation
course allocation
scheduling
tabu search
competitive equilibrium
experiments
preference elicitation
user interface design
Acceso en línea:http://eudl.eu/doi/10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2261075
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