Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective
If someone disagrees with my moral views, or more generally if I’m in a group of n people who all disagree with each other, but I don’t have any special evidence or basis for my epistemic superiority, then it’s at best a 1-in-n chance that my views are correct. The skeptical threat from disagreement...
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Publicado em: |
Michigan Publishing
2021-12-01
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| coleção: | Ergo, An Open Access Journal of Philosophy |
| Acesso em linha: | https://journals.publishing.umich.edu/ergo/article/id/1155/ |
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