Time-Inconsistent Bargaining and Cross-Commitments
The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players’ present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in per...
Tallennettuna:
| Päätekijä: | |
|---|---|
| Aineistotyyppi: | Artigo |
| Kieli: | Inglês |
| Julkaistu: |
MDPI AG
2023-04-01
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| Sarja: | Games |
| Aiheet: | |
| Linkit: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/38 |
| Tagit: |
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