Davidson’s antirealism?
Frederic Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) has argued that a Davidsonian theory of meaning is incompatible with a realist view of truth, on which the truth-conditions of sentences consist of mind-independent states of affairs or concatenations of extra-linguistic objects. In this paper we show that Stoutland...
Gorde:
| Egile Nagusiak: | , |
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| Formatua: | Artigo |
| Hizkuntza: | Inglês |
| Argitaratua: |
Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS
2015-04-01
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| Saila: | Revista de Filosofia |
| Sarrera elektronikoa: | https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/697 |
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