Three Is a Crowd: Information and Electoral Coordination in Argentina
Successful coordination around a Duvergerian equilibrium requires accurate and consistent information about parties’ expected electoral support. In practice, such information is often unreliable and rarely available at the local level, thus hindering voters’ coordination. In this paper, we leverage...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprache: | Inglês |
| Veröffentlicht: |
Cambridge University Press
2026-01-01
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| Schriftenreihe: | British Journal of Political Science |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0007123425101191/type/journal_article |
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