Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A...
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| Principais autores: | , , |
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| 格式: | Artigo |
| 語言: | Inglês |
| 出版: |
Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design
2023-12-01
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| 叢編: | Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design |
| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: |
http://www.mechanism-design.org/arch/v008-1/p_01.pdf
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