Consequences of Explanationism
If Explanationism is true, then, for any fact and any person, the fact’s explaining why they believe it is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for their knowing it. In this paper I question the sufficiency of the condition and argue against its necessity.
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| Hoofdauteur: | |
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| Formaat: | Artigo |
| Taal: | Inglês |
| Gepubliceerd in: |
Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences
2025-05-01
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| Reeks: | Organon F |
| Onderwerpen: | |
| Online toegang: | https://www.sav.sk/journals/uploads/06040840orgf.2025.32204.pdf |
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