Deception and price in a market with asymmetric information
In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonethele...
Uloženo v:
| Hlavní autoři: | , |
|---|---|
| Médium: | Artigo |
| Jazyk: | Inglês |
| Vydáno: |
Cambridge University Press
2007-02-01
|
| Edice: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Témata: | |
| On-line přístup: | http://journal.sjdm.org/jdm06161.pdf |
| Tagy: |
Žádné tagy, Buďte první, kdo vytvoří štítek k tomuto záznamu!
|