My colleague is corrupt: Information disclosure to control corruption
The paper argues that the co-workers of a corrupt public official are in the best position to provide proof of corruption. It, with the help of a game-theoretic model, discusses the incentive structure that will allow a co-worker to disclose the information on a corrupt public servant. The study arg...
Gespeichert in:
| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprache: | Inglês |
| Veröffentlicht: |
General Association of Economists from Romania
2021-03-01
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| Schriftenreihe: | Theoretical and Applied Economics |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: |
http://store.ectap.ro/articole/1535.pdf
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