Incentive mechanism of government overcommitment in PPPs based on investors’ fairness preference

In public-private partnerships (PPPs), governments sometimes may not afford the guarantees in full as initially agreed upon due to limited fiscal budgets. Accordingly, government overcommitment can occur. The degree of government overcommitment fulfillment affects not only the incentives provided b...

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Principais autores:	Qi Luo, Jicai Liu
Format:	Artigo
Jezik:	Inglês
Izdano:	Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2024-03-01
Serija:	International Journal of Strategic Property Management
Teme:	public-private partnerships (PPPs) government overcommitment incentive mechanism fairness preference willingness to cooperate
Online dostop:	https://transport.vgtu.lt/index.php/IJSPM/article/view/21028
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