When my Own Beliefs are not First-Personal Enough
Richard Moran has defended the need for two modes of access to our mental contents, a first-personal and a third-personal one. In this paper we maintain that, in the moral case, an excess of concentration on the a third-personal perspective precludes accounting for our responsibility over our own be...
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
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| Format: | Artigo |
| Sprache: | Inglês |
| Veröffentlicht: |
University of the Basque Country
2009-12-01
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| Schriftenreihe: | Theoria |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/THEORIA/article/view/480 |
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