WAGE-RISE CONTRACT AND MIXED COURNOT DUOPOLY COMPETITION WITH PROFIT-MAXIMIZING AND SOCIALLY CONCERNED FIRMS
This paper investigates a Cournot game model with a nonlinear demand function where a profit-maximizing firm competes against a socially concerned firm. The timing of the game is as follows. In stage one, each firm non-cooperatively decides whether to offer a wage-rise contract policy (WRCP) as a st...
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| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Μορφή: | Artigo |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglês |
| Έκδοση: |
World Scientific Publishing
2022-04-01
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| Σειρά: | Journal of Business & Economic Analysis |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/10.1142/S2737566822500025 |
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