On incentive compatible designs of forecasting contracts
In the paper the optimal design of forecasting contracts in principalagent setting is investigated. It is assumed that the principal pays the agent (theforecaster) based on an announced forecast and an event that materializes next.Such a contract is called incentive compatible if the agent maximizes...
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| Autore principale: | |
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| Natura: | Artigo |
| Lingua: | Inglês |
| Pubblicazione: |
Wydawnictwo SGGW - Warsaw University of Life Sciences Press
2010-12-01
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| Serie: | Quantitative Methods in Economics |
| Soggetti: | |
| Accesso online: | https://qme.sggw.edu.pl/article/view/3060 |
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