Electoral Cycles and Minimum Wages in Argentina
We document the evolution of minimum salaries in Argentina during electoral cycles. We argue that incumbent politicians tend to significantly increase the growth rates of minimum salaries a few days before primary elections, and they generally keep them high for a long period until general elections...
Αποθηκεύτηκε σε:
| Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | , |
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| Μορφή: | Artigo |
| Γλώσσα: | Inglês |
| Έκδοση: |
MDPI AG
2026-04-01
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| Σειρά: | Social Sciences |
| Θέματα: | |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: | https://www.mdpi.com/2076-0760/15/4/236 |
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