Central banking reform and overcoming the moral hazard problem: the case of Brazil
ABSTRACT The implicit assumption that governments will bailout financial institutions under distress can generate negative incentives for the development of a sound financial system. This paper begins from the premise that these negative incentives, which create a situation of moral hazard, is essen...
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| Автори: | , , |
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| Формат: | Artigo |
| Мова: | Inglês |
| Опубліковано: |
Centro de Economia Política
2021-07-01
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| Серія: | Brazilian Journal of Political Economy |
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0101-31572001000300407&tlng=en |
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