Provision of Public Goods via Unilateral but Mutually Conditional Commitments—Mechanism, Equilibria, and Learning

We propose a one-shot, non-cooperative mechanism that implements the core in a large class of public goods games. Players simultaneously choose conditional commitment functions, which are binding unilateral commitments that condition a player’s contribution on the contributions of others. We prove t...

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Glavni avtor:	Jobst Heitzig
Format:	Artigo
Jezik:	Inglês
Izdano:	MDPI AG 2025-11-01
Serija:	Games
Teme:	public good conditional commitment core of a game strong equilibrium learning in games package deal
Online dostop:	https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/16/6/58
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