Managerial Incentives in Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly Model with Complementary Goods
This paper examines a price-setting mixed duopoly model in which a state-owned public firm and a private firm produce complementary goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. Each firm has one owner and can hire one manager to make its production decisions. The paper first analyzes the followi...
I tiakina i:
| Kaituhi matua: | |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Artigo |
| Reo: | Inglês |
| I whakaputaina: |
Mashhad: Behzad Hassannezhad Kashani
2021-05-01
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| Rangatū: | International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://www.ijmae.com/article_132911_817e40ecb9ce186220c20cfc9bf301ae.pdf |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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