A Defence of a Rationalist Conception of Practical Reason
In this paper I attempt to refute the instrumental conception of practical reason, and thus defend a rationalist conception of practical reason. I argue that, far from merely playing an instrumental role, reason can be used by an agent to evaluate, that is, to approve or reject, final ends, which mi...
Збережено в:
| Автор: | |
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| Формат: | Artigo |
| Мова: | Inglês |
| Опубліковано: |
University of Rijeka. Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
2017-12-01
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| Серія: | European Journal of Analytic Philosophy |
| Предмети: | |
| Онлайн доступ: | https://hrcak.srce.hr/188212 |
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