An approach to the non-conceptual content of emotions
There is the intuition that some emotions do not sustain a cognitively demanding reading of their representational content. However, it is not evident how to articulate that intuition—and the mere claim that the content of those emotions is not conceptual (or, alternatively, that it is non-conceptua...
Guardado en:
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artigo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglês |
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Editora Universitária Champagnat - PUCPRESS
2019-12-01
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| Colección: | Revista de Filosofia |
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://periodicos.pucpr.br/index.php/aurora/article/view/25617 |
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