Clarifying social norms which have robustness against reputation costs and defector invasion in indirect reciprocity

Abstract The evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocity is a pivotal mechanism for sustaining large-scale societies. Because third parties return cooperative behaviour in indirect reciprocity, reputations that assess and share these third parties’ behaviour play an essential role. Studies...

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Autores principales:	Hitoshi Yamamoto, Isamu Okada, Tatsuya Sasaki, Satoshi Uchida
Formato:	Artigo
Lenguaje:	Inglês
Publicado:	Nature Portfolio 2024-10-01
Colección:	Scientific Reports
Materias:	Evolution of cooperation Indirect reciprocity Social norm Agent-based simulation
Acceso en línea:	https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-024-76168-5
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