Is Leibniz's Theory of 'I' Coherent?
As Margaret Wilson famously argued, Leibniz appears committed to two mutually inconsistent propositions: (1) I am a particular substance, and (2) It is metaphysically possible that I continue to exist independently of this particular substance. Three solutions have been offered to this conundrum on...
I tiakina i:
| Ngā kaituhi matua: | , |
|---|---|
| Hōputu: | Artigo |
| Reo: | Inglês |
| I whakaputaina: |
Aperio
2025-11-01
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| Rangatū: | Journal of Modern Philosophy |
| Ngā marau: | |
| Urunga tuihono: | https://jmphil.org/article/id/2607/ |
| Ngā Tūtohu: |
Kāore He Tūtohu, Me noho koe te mea tuatahi ki te tūtohu i tēnei pūkete!
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